Six Logistics Truths Reshape Joint Force Readiness

When the Defense Logistics Agency prepared its Campaign of Learning burst paper in October 2025, the document framed logistics as a primary determinant of outcomes in future conflicts. The paper sets out six modern "contested logistics truths" that define how data, networks, and industrial capacity must support joint operations, according to the Defense Logistics Agency.

Authored by DLA Director Army Lt. Gen. Mark Simerly and Leighann Martin of the agency's Strategic Initiatives Group, the paper argues that traditional efficiency metrics reflect assumptions about stable supply chains. In their place, it describes a logistics standard built on data visibility, forward production, and networks able to operate while under kinetic and cyber threat.

The analysis links recent shocks, including the COVID-19 pandemic and conflicts such as the war in Ukraine, to the environment facing U.S. and allied forces. DLA's 2025 coverage describes adversaries as likely to target logistics networks and critical infrastructure early in a conflict, which means disruptions must be treated as an expected condition rather than an outlier.

Six concise statements capture that shift: logistics wins wars when data leads the fight, "just-in-time" is not on time, logistics networks must be better connected and protected, precise requirements drive readiness, resilient distribution networks power operational dominance, and lethality is impossible without logistics.

Each truth updates a 2015 set of Air Force logistics truths attributed to Lt. Gen. John B. Cooper (Ret.) in DLA's summary of the effort. The revision adds emphasis on cyber defense, artificial intelligence and machine learning, and an explicit expectation that supply routes and digital systems will be contested.

DLA also connects the truths to its stated fiscal 2026 priorities: Set the Globe, Set the Agency, and Set Supply Chains. These priorities focus on positioning for readiness in key theaters, accelerating internal transformation, and modernizing supply chains as part of planning for fiscal year 2026.

Taken together, the truths represent a shift that places availability at the point of need ahead of cost efficiency. The following sections describe how the new guidance affects planning, procurement, and maintenance across the services.

Key Strategic Shifts in Military Logistics

Modern contested logistics truths update 2015 LOGTRUTHS for new threats and tools
Data visibility and quality displace cost as primary logistics metrics
"Just enough" replaces just-in-time to prioritize resilience over lean inventories
Decentralized, cyber-secure, multi-nodal networks reduce disruption risk
Accurate forecasting and industrial-base visibility underwrite combat readiness

Data Over Efficiency

The first truth states that "logistics wins wars when data leads the fight." In DLA's framing, logistics is not a back-office support function but a battlefield imperative driven by real-time information, as highlighted in a 2025 article from the Defense Logistics Agency.

This view requires near-continuous data flows from commercial suppliers to dispersed combat units and tools that can convert those feeds into timely demand signals. In this model, legacy reports compiled manually at long intervals risk hiding emerging shortages or bottlenecks.

Commanders instead need live consumption dashboards that can distinguish between routine variation and signs of strain in specific platforms, locations, or commodities. DLA materials describe a feedback loop in which operational plans are continuously assessed against availability rates and forecasted gaps.

Machine learning systems are expected to help identify emerging shortfalls, which can in turn drive plan adjustments or early resupply actions. Building this loop requires standardized data labels, encrypted transmission paths, and shared views across combatant commands and agencies.

The aim is to integrate flight, sealift, and ground convoy schedules into a single operational picture that makes sustainment status visible to planners and operators. The paper also points to predictive maintenance and other analytic tools as central to this approach.

Predictive systems schedule repairs based on real-time indicators rather than fixed timelines, while analytic models scan operational data to detect recurring bottlenecks or systemic issues before they degrade readiness.

Across these initiatives, data quality matters more than volume. Poor or inconsistent inputs can create a false picture of readiness faster than paper-based processes, which is why the first truth treats logistics data and information systems as operational capabilities that require protection and resourcing alongside traditional platforms.

From Just-in-Time to Just Enough

The second truth rejects longstanding just-in-time doctrine for military logistics. DLA's 2025 coverage notes that the COVID-19 pandemic, the war in Ukraine, and other global disruptions exposed the fragility of lean inventories that rely on predictable transit lanes, a theme developed in the agency's "Just Enough Logistics" features from the Defense Logistics Agency.

DLA's answer is a tiered "just-enough" model that widens safety stocks for items with high operational risk while managing routine consumables with tighter replenishment cycles. Rather than maximizing inventory turns, the model assigns different readiness levels based on an item's role and the consequences of a delay or shortfall.

Artificial intelligence supports this scheme through demand-forecast engines that combine historical usage, platform health indicators from predictive maintenance systems, and intelligence estimates. When the probability of conflict rises or operational tempo increases, these tools can nudge orders upward and identify which depots or units need reinforcement first.

DLA's materials describe additive manufacturing, often referred to as 3D printing, as an extension of the just-enough approach. Forward sites may be able to fabricate low-volume repair parts in theater, which shortens lines of communication and reduces the burden on strategic lift.

Complex or highly specialized components continue to require traditional industrial processes. Commanders and logisticians who are accustomed to focusing on warehouse productivity metrics must adapt to a model that values risk absorption.

In this framing, stockouts for critical items represent a greater operational risk than modest overages, and resilience during disruptions takes precedence over steady-state efficiency. The just-enough model also has policy implications.

Pre-positioned stocks and tiered readiness levels can give political leaders more options by maintaining credible readiness while allowing for gradual mobilization, which may support diplomatic efforts without reducing the ability to respond if negotiations fail.

Networks Built to Withstand Attack

Truths three and five focus on how logistics networks are structured: they must be better connected and protected, and resilient distribution networks power operational dominance. DLA's burst paper describes centralized enterprise resource planning systems as efficient in peacetime, but highly vulnerable if a single malware event or outage can halt transportation orders across a theater, as summarized by the Defense Logistics Agency.

To address this risk, the paper calls for decentralized networks that can continue operating if central systems are compromised. This includes building local or regional fallbacks for key functions and ensuring that digital systems across services and combatant commands can exchange data securely even under degraded conditions.

Cybersecurity in this construct shifts from being a compliance requirement to a core element of mission assurance. Investments in advanced cybersecurity tools, secure software development, and access controls compete directly with traditional logistics spending on warehouses, handling equipment, and vehicles.

Physical routing receives similar attention. Planners are expected to chart multiple sea, air, and overland routes so that damage to a port, airfield, or chokepoint leads to diversions rather than suspension of supply.

DLA materials note that autonomous or remotely operated platforms can contribute to this flexibility by enabling resupply options in high-risk areas. In peacetime, maintaining multiple routes, hardened depots, and backup systems can appear expensive.

In conflict, the same redundancy allows operations to continue despite attacks or failures that would disable a single-route system, provided that standardized data links ensure diverted shipments are visible across all transportation modes.

The intended result is a logistics network with several viable paths between key nodes so that the loss of one connection does not halt the movement of fuel, munitions, or other critical supplies. Without that kind of agility, combat power can decline faster than new materiel reaches the field.

Precision Sustains Lethality

Truth four, "precise requirements drive readiness," links forecasting accuracy to constrained resources such as inventory, transportation, and maintenance capacity. Inventory buffers are finite, and lift capacity often competes with troop movement and medical evacuation, so misjudging consumption rates consumes readiness that cannot be quickly restored.

DLA's proposal combines traditional demand planning with real-time telemetry and operational data from platforms. According to 2025 coverage by the Defense Logistics Agency, indicators of equipment wear can support predictive maintenance and trigger earlier parts orders, provided secure links are available to transmit health data from the field.

Industrial-base visibility expands this picture beyond immediate consumption. DLA's articles describe models that monitor supplier performance and material availability to identify fragility in the defense industrial base, with pandemic-era shortages cited as a reason to track key inputs and production capacity more closely.

When forecasting and industrial-base monitoring function together, commanders can accept calculated risk instead of relying on large static stockpiles. Fleets and units can operate with leaner on-hand reserves because planners have confidence that replenishment will arrive before critical thresholds are reached.

These practices reinforce the sixth truth that lethality is impossible without logistics. Missiles, aircraft, and maneuver units require predictable access to fuel, munitions, repair parts, and support services, and DLA presents the six truths as a way to align planning, budgeting, and modernization efforts with that reality.

Fiscal decisions are a key test of whether this alignment occurs in practice. The DLA articles suggest that funding for data systems, cyber protection, and distribution resilience often competes with more visible combat platforms, so the modern contested logistics truths offer a benchmark to assess whether budgets match stated operational priorities.

The truths also have implications for allies and partners. Interoperable data standards, shared demand forecasts, and coordinated pre-positioning are described as prerequisites for coalition operations; without them, multinational formations may share command arrangements but still rely on separate and vulnerable supply chains.

Collectively, the modern contested logistics truths link uninterrupted flow of materiel to the range of operational choices available to commanders. Planners who recognize this relationship can design campaigns and exercises that are achievable within the limits of their logistics networks.

The 2025 burst paper presents the truths as a reference point for future procurement, posture, and modernization decisions across the joint logistics enterprise. How fully the joint force adopts them will be measured in upcoming exercises and real-world crises, where the performance of data, supply chains, and distribution networks will be visible alongside more familiar combat indicators.

For now, DLA's framework places logistics at the center of joint force readiness in both peacetime and conflict. It makes clear that investments in data, resiliency, and industrial capacity are not ancillary to combat power but integral to sustaining it under contested conditions.